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This report provides information on the 
impact of a unit pricing scheme for 
domestic solid waste collection and 
disposal in Olongapo City, the 
Philippines. It investigates how the 
amount of waste households produce 
changes if they are charged a collection 
rate dependent on the number of bags of 
garbage they produce. It investigates 
how such a scheme would affect both 
the overall volume of waste produced in 
the city and the overall cost of managing 
this waste. 
Shifting from the current flat rate to unit 
pricing of solid waste in Olongapo City 
would increase waste recycling and 
create welfare gains. The amount of 
waste that would have to be disposed of 
by burning or landfill would go down, 
as would the size of most household‟s 
waste bills. The report recommends that 
the city should be adopted in similar 
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 IMPACTS OF UNIT PRICING OF SOLID WASTE COLLECTION 
AND DISPOSAL IN OLONGAPO CITY, PHILIPPINES 1 
 
 
Ma. Eugenia C. Bennagen and Vincent Altez 
   
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
This study examines the potential impacts of the unit pricing of solid waste 
collection and disposal on the solid waste management system of Olongapo City. 
Currently, the city is under a flat garbage fee regime that has been implemented by the 
local government since 1989. 
Under unit-based or quantity-based pricing systems, waste generators are charged 
based on the quantity of wastes they dispose of.  The system, in principle, provides 
incentives for waste reduction and diversion since waste generators who dispose of more 
garbage have to pay more, and those who dispose of less garbage, pay proportionally less.  
Moreover, when the unit price reflects the marginal social cost of waste collection and 
disposal, there are potential welfare benefits to be gained from shifting to such a pricing 
program.   
 A unit pricing system was tested in Olongapo City in order to examine how 
households respond to incentives to reduce the quantity of wastes they dispose of and to 
estimate the welfare gains it would produce. The system tested resulted in a 24 percent 
reduction in the household production of non-recyclable wastes and generated an annual 
disposal cost saving of PHP3.1 million.  The potential welfare gains for the city associated 
with such a unit pricing system were estimated to be almost Php 10.0 million annually.  
 
The report recommends that the city should implement such a scheme and makes 
suggestions for how it should be organized and structured. It also recommends that such a 







Unit pricing of solid waste collection and disposal, more popularly known as pay-
as-you-throw or pay-per-bag, is a solid waste management approach that aims to reduce 
the amount of wastes discarded by people.  In principle, this approach provides incentives 
for waste reduction and diversion since the less garbage people discard, the less they have 
to pay.  Empirical studies in the U.S.A., where such a system is implemented in over 4,000 
                                                          
1 This research was funded by the Environment and Economy Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA).  Unit 
pricing of solid wastes in this study refers to the pricing of solid waste collection and disposal services in 
terms of volume or weight. The terms  “non-recyclable wastes”, non-recyclables” and “garbage” are used 
interchangeably to refer to the wastes that a household disposes for collection, after separating wastes that 
can be reused such as food and yard wastes, plastics, paper, and others.  These reusable wastes are referred 




communities, indicate that unit pricing programs have resulted in waste diversion and 
welfare gains (Kinnaman & Fullerton 2000).   
In the Philippines, and in most developing countries, the pricing of garbage 
collection and disposal is not widely practiced.  In the areas where it is implemented, local 
governments, who traditionally have responsibility over solid waste management, apply it 
exclusively to the commercial or business sector.  Yet, domestic or household garbage 
accounts for 60-70 percent of the total amount of garbage produced in these countries.  
There are very few local governments that charge households for the solid waste collection 
and disposal services they provide. Those that do, charge the fee as part of an annual 
property tax or collect a flat monthly fee.  Such a system discourages the efficient disposal 
of waste products since households pay the same fee regardless of the amount of garbage 
they throw out.  Their marginal or incremental waste disposal cost is therefore zero.   
The almost total absence of unit pricing programs in developing countries may be 
largely due to the lack of information on their benefits.  This research aimed to fill this 
information gap and to demonstrate the potential waste diversion and welfare gains such 
systems could bring to developing countries.  To do this, an experiment was conducted in 
Olongapo City, an urbanizing area north of Metro Manila. The experiment tested a unit 
pricing system to see how households respond to incentives designed to encourage them to 
reduce the amount of garbage they discard.  The main hypothesis of the research was that 
the introduction of unit pricing brings aggregate social benefits to a community. 
The report is organized as follows:  Section II briefly discusses the conceptual 
framework of the research. This is followed by a review of relevant literature in Section 
III. Section IV contains a discussion of the solid waste management system of Olongapo 
City. Section V discusses the methodology and results of the socio-economic survey that 
was used to collect household baseline information.  Section VI discusses the main 
experiment design and analyzes its results.  A brief proposal for a two-tiered unit pricing 
system in Olongapo City is discussed in Section VII. The last two sections contain a 




2.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 1 shows a downward sloping demand curve for solid waste collection 
services (SWS). Demand for SWS, measured in terms of quantity of waste discarded, 
increases as price decreases.  In most cases in the developing world, and also in developed 
countries in the recent past, households pay a flat fee and therefore face a zero marginal or 
incremental cost of SWS.  Under a flat-fee pricing scheme, households will generate 
inefficiently high levels of garbage.  This is shown in Figure 1 where households paying a 
flat fee face a zero price for increments in collection services, thus, demand for SWS or 
quantity of waste discarded will be at Qz. 
Figure 1.  The Demand Curve for Residential Solid Waste Services (SWS). 
   Source: Jenkins, R. R. (1993), with modifications. 
With the introduction of marginal or incremental pricing of SWS, households will 
now be charged a price per unit of SWS, say, P*.  Note that with marginal pricing, the 
demand for SWS shifts to the left and is now at Q*.  The demand for SWS, as measured by 
the quantity of household waste discarded, declines with a price increase in SWS.   
For economic efficiency, it is not sufficient that only the private cost of SWS is 
reflected in the price or marginal cost function.  There are a number of externalities related 
to SWS, such as public health risks, groundwater pollution and foul odors. When these are 
considered, there is a divergence between the private cost of providing the services and the 
cost that these services impose on society at large. 
 The price, P*, should therefore incorporate not only the private cost of SWS, but 
also the external cost.  In Figure 1, when the marginal external cost of SWS is reflected in 
the pricing of SWS, at P** ,  the SWS demand shifts further to the left, at Q** .  This results 
in a further decline in the quantity of wastes discarded.  Thus, for efficiency or optimality, 
the price per unit charged to households should reflect the social cost of SWS. This 







Quantity of SWS = 
Quantity of Waste Discarded 
Marginal 
social cost 











At Qz , the quantity of waste discarded is beyond the optimal level. The cost to 
society of disposing of that quantity of waste is therefore greater than the benefit that 
households gain from having it discarded.  The triangle abc represents the welfare loss to 
society under a zero marginal pricing regime.  There is good evidence that the marginal 




                               3.0  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
3.1 External Costs of Solid Waste Management 
There is limited information available on the external costs of solid waste 
collection and disposal.  Using environmental life cycle and economic valuation 
methodologies, a European Commission study reported that the average net environmental 
cost of land filling (with no gas recovery) ranged from ECU 4/ton in the United Kingdom 
to ECU 20/ton in Greece.  These estimated external costs increased total waste disposal 
costs in the UK by 15 percent and by 100 percent in Greece  (Brisson 1997).  
In order to estimate the user fee for solid waste collection and disposal in the 
U.S.A., Repetto et al. used the results of two studies that estimated the social costs of 
waste disposal (1992).2  These costs included the risks of air and water pollution, along 
with noise, and other disamenities.  Both studies found that, in the states they covered, the 
social costs of waste disposal into a lined landfill with leachate collection were of the same 
approximate magnitude as the private costs.  Using these studies, the Repetto research 
assumed that non-market solid waste disposal costs are of the same magnitude as market 
disposal costs in all North American states. 
3.2 Impact of Unit Pricing on Quantity of Waste Discarded 
The field of market-based incentives for waste reduction has been extensively 
researched by economists and other specialists over the past decade (Fullerton and 
Kinnaman 1996; Reschovsky & Stone 1994; Jenkins 1993;  Repetto et al. 1992; among 
others).  
All of these studies argue that the flat fee pricing of waste disposal is inefficient 
and does not encourage waste reduction since the marginal cost of waste disposal is zero.  
Unit pricing as an alternative instrument has been shown empirically to be effective in 
reducing waste generation by U.S. households.  For instance, an analysis of survey data 
from ten U.S. communities with pay-by-the-bag systems show that an increase in the 
collection fee per 15-kilogram bag from zero to $1.50 results in an 18-percent reduction in 
the volume of solid wastes disposed of to landfill. The same increase results in a 30-
percent reduction when accompanied by a community curbside recycling program 
(Repetto et al. 1992).  
A quantity-based pricing scheme in High Bridge, New Jersey, which charged 
communities $2.69 for the first tag and $1.25 per additional tag reported a 25 percent 
decline in trash volume (Reschovsky and Stone 1994).  In Charlottsville, Virginia, a pay-
per-bag pricing scheme prompted the average person to reduce the weight and volume of 
their garbage by 14 and 37 percent respectively and to increase the weight of their 
recyclables by 16 percent (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996).  Data from 21 communities 
with unit pricing schemes, show that these schemes reduced garbage by between 17 and 
74 percent and increased recycling by 128 percent (Miranda et al. 1994).  Survey data 
                                                          
2 R. F. Stone and N.A. Ashford, “Package Deal: The Economic Impacts of Recycling Standards for 
Packaging in Massachusetts,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 1991; and Tellus Institute, 
“Disposal Cost Fee Study:  Final Report”, prepared for California Integrated Waste Management Board, 
Boston: Tellus Institute, February 1991.  Unfortunately, the researcher is not able to discuss the 
methodology used in these two studies as she was not able to access copies of these reports. 
 
 6 
from Portland, Oregon (Hong et al. 1993) on the other hand show that while the adoption 
of a user fee increases the probability that a household recycles, it does not appreciably 
reduce the quantity of garbage produced at the curb. 
In a unit-pricing demonstration project in 1995 in Marietta, Georgia, residents 
participated in two different programs requiring the payment of user fees.  Half of the 
residents participated in a bag program in which each household paid a fixed price of 
$0.75 for each bag set out for collection.  The other half participated in a subscription can 
program in which they set up agreements for a maximum number of cans of waste to be 
collected on any given collection day.  The results indicated that the bag program reduced 
mixed waste by as much as 51 percent, while the can program by approximately 20 
percent.  In both programs the probability of households recycling increased by 18 percent 
(Van Houtven and Morris 1999). 
In Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the city implemented a 12-week pilot project in April 1997 
that combined curbside recycling pick up with a pay-as-you-throw program. The program 
reported that diversion and recycling rates rose to encouraging levels and projected that if 
implemented city-wide, the program could possibly extend the life of the city‟s landfill for 
an extra four years (Block 1997).   
3.3   Welfare Gains from Unit Pricing 
Using panel data covering 12 U.S. cities, Jenkins (1993) estimated welfare gains 
from pricing garbage according to its social marginal cost. He found that this would 
improve social welfare by as much as US$650 million per year or roughly US$3 per 
person per year.  Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) calculated approximately the same 
estimate.  In the Georgia demonstration project, the net savings in explicit costs per day 
were estimated at $215 for the bag program and $72 for the can program. When avoided 
external costs were included, net benefits were $586 for the bag program and $234 for the 
can program (Van Houtven and Morris 1999).  Finally, Repetto et al estimated the annual 
net savings from a pay-per-bag pricing system, based on both market and non-market 
waste disposal costs, at US$2.2 million for moderate-cost communities and US$7.0 
million for high-cost communities (1992).   
A number of these researchers, however, caution readers about the magnitude of 
the estimates particularly in cases where illicit or illegal dumping of wastes is a disposal 
option.  For instance, the Fullerman & Kinnaman study (1996) estimates that about 28 
percent of the reduction in garbage may have been due to illegal dumping.  According to 
Jenkins (1993), municipal waste authorities have suggested that illegal dumping does 




4.0 CURRENT SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
(SWM) IN OLONGAPO CITY:  FOCUS ON COST 
STRUCTURE 
4.1 Brief Description of SWM in Olongapo City 
Olongapo City is located 127 km north of Metro Manila. It has a population of 
194,260 (Census 2000) that generates about 66 tons of garbage daily.3  The city 
government is directly responsible for solid waste management. This consists principally 
of a traditional collect and dump system.  Households and commercial establishments pay 
monthly garbage fees for a twice-weekly waste collection service.  Waste collection for 
recycling is done under permit by ambulant collectors.  Recyclables are sold to junkshops 
that in turn sell on to recycling establishments. 
 Households are charged a flat household monthly fee of PhP30-40 (depending on 
lot size) and commercial establishments a fee of PhP 50-500 (depending on the nature of 
business and other factors).4  The garbage fees collected fund the activities of the 
Environmental Sanitation and Management Office (ESMO) that handles SWM.  In 
addition to waste collection and disposal, ESMO also handles other city services such as 
sanitation and beautification.  
During recent years, the City has been incurring deficits as garbage fees collected 
have not covered expenditures. This deficit is charged to the City Government‟s budget.  
In turn, the City government has resorted to periodic fee increases to cover its losses.  
Three fee increases have been imposed since the fee system was implemented in 1989, 
with the most recent one taking effect in September 2002.5   
4.2 Private Costs of SWM 
Table 1 below shows that there has been a significant increase in SWM costs in 
Olongapo City. These have grown by 17 percent annually since 1997. Waste tonnages, on 
the other hand, have increased by only about 5 percent annually over the same period.6  
Wages, salaries and benefits were responsible for a significant percentage of the increase 
in SWM costs. ESMO had only 52 permanent personnel in 1997 and this increased to 141 
in 2001.7  Gas and oil costs were also significant since expenditure on fuel for SWM has 
increased considerably since 1997, mainly due to fuel price increases. (see Appendix 
Table 1 for a more detailed version of the FCA).8 
                                                          
3 Site of former US military bases in Subic.  Metropolitan Manila generates about 6,000 tons/day. 
4 At the time the research was conducted, households with lot sizes less than 100 sq m were charged 
P30/month; those with lots larger than 100 sq m. were charged P40/month.  The exchange rate at the time of 
the study was  US$1:Php 50.   
5 The September 2002 increase is not considered in this study. 
6 The study implemented full cost accounting (FCA) to examine the cost structure of the City‟s SWM 
system. It adopted that US Environmental Protection Agency FCA framework (USEPA 1997 & 1998). 
7 This law resulted in substantial increases both in number and salaries of government personnel in 
Olongapo City. 




Table 1.  Cost Structure of SWM Collect and Dump System and Waste Generation, 
Olongapo City, 1997 and 2001  (in million Php). 
 
Cost Component 1997 2001 Growth rate (annual) 
Personal services (labor) 7.93 14.35 20.2 
Operating expenses 2.17 4.94 32.0 
Up-front costs 1.39 1.26 ( 2.3 ) 
Back-end costs 
 










Total (includes external costs) 26.0 44.12 17.4 
Non-recyclable wastes disposed  
(tons) 20,075 23,748 4.6 
 na – not applicable; assumes constant back-end costs. 
 
4.3 SWM Unit Costs 
Full cost accounting allows the estimation of important SWM indicators such as 
those unit costs shown in Table 2.  Based on the FCA accounts and waste generation data 
from Olongapo City, the average cost per unit of waste collected and disposed of in 2001, 
without accounting for external costs, was P929 per ton.   
It is also possible to estimate the cost of servicing the household sector using FCA. 
Since the residential sector accounts for 80 percent of total wastes disposed of in 
Olongapo City, the analysis assumes it also accounts for 80 percent of total service cost.  
With a service household sector of 34,742 households in 2001, the monthly service cost 
during this year was P42 per household for waste collected and disposed.9   
4.4 External Costs of SWM 
The external costs of solid waste collection and disposal consist of the 
environmental damages and human health problems that arise from improper waste 
collection and disposal.  More specifically, the potential impacts of waste collection 
include: risk of injury to the public by large and poorly maintained garbage trucks; road 
congestion that causes air and noise pollution and road destruction; and litter escaping 
from the trucks.  The potential external costs from waste disposal include: threats to public 
health from the pollution of ground and surface water; methane gas release and 
explosions; and aesthetic problems caused by noises and odors.   
In developing countries such as the Philippines, the environmental impact of waste 
disposal sites is expected to be larger than in the United States, since most sites in the 
Philippines are open dumps while the majority of those in the States are covered. 
However, the monetary valuation per unit of environmental impact (using willingness-to-
                                                          
9 The monthly service cost of P42 per household was computed as follows:  80 percent of total service cost 
/number of households served / 12 months (see Appendix Table 2). 
 
 9 
pay valuation or WTP) is likely to be lower in developing countries. This is because the 
WTP to avoid the impacts of waste disposal is lower in developing countries where 
incomes are lower.  
Given the very poor disposal facilities in the Philippines, it may thus be reasonable 
to assume that the environmental costs per unit are greater than the private costs 
(Bennagen et al. 2002).  This study however adopts a conservative estimate for the 
environmental cost of waste disposal used and assumes that the environmental cost per ton 
of waste disposed of in Olongapo City  approximates that of  private cost (see column 3 of 
Table 2). 
 
  Table  2.  SWM Unit Costs, Olongapo City, 2001 (in Php). 
 
Cost Item Private Social * 
Service cost per ton  (all sources) 929 1,858 
Service cost per household (annual) 508.   1,016 
Service cost per household (monthly)   42   84 
   
 




5.0   THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY 
5.1 Sampling Design and Survey Questionnaire 
A socio-economic survey of a citywide sample of 360 households was conducted.  
This sample was proportionally allocated to the 17 barangays of the city using household 
population as weight.  Four puroks (districts) in each barangay were randomly drawn and 
the allocated sample for the relevant barangay was equally allocated among them (no 
information on purok population was available).  Finally, every tenth household in each 
purok was systematically selected as the sample household. The survey was conducted in 
June and July 2002. 
Population density has been shown to affect household waste management 
behavior (Jenkins 1993).  On the one hand, households in densely populated communities 
have less storage space and therefore discard and replace items more often.  However, 
they also have better access to shops, so goods are purchased more often and in smaller 
quantities. This results in more packaging for disposal.  On the other hand, households in 
less dense communities with large backyards generate large quantities of yard waste and 
therefore have a greater need for solid waste services. 
To get more information about the impact of population density on waste 
management behavior and to help delineate the sample for the experiment, the 17 
barangays of Olongapo City were classified as high and low density. One hundred persons 
per hectare was used as the threshold for the high/low density classification. Ten 
barangays were found to belong to the high density classification, the rest were low 
density barangays. Over all, 62 percent of households reside in the low density barangays, 
while 38 percent are from the high density areas (see Appendix Table 3). 
The main purpose of the survey was to collect baseline information on the 
economic and demographic characteristics of the sampled households as well as their 
waste management practices and attitudes.  In addition to its use in the current research, 
this baseline information can be useful in the future for an impact assessment, if or when 
the local government decides to implement a unit pricing system. 
The survey questionnaire included questions on waste generation in which 
households were asked to estimate the weight of all the different types of wastes they 
generated. The waste quantity data reported in this section are therefore self-reported 
estimates of  the households. 
5.2 Socio-economic Characteristics and SWM Practices of Sampled Households 
The average monthly income of the sampled households was PhP12,843 and the 
average household expenditure was PhP 11,791/month. Food comprised 48 percent of 
total expenditures (Table 3).10  Households in high-density communities, clustered around 
the town (poblacion), had higher incomes than those in low-density communities since the 
town offered more work opportunities.   
                                                          
10 Official income estimates, based on the 2000 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), reported an 
average monthly income in Olongapo City of PhP 16,411 and an average monthly expenditure of PhP 
13,393.  (National Statistics Office-FIES 2000).  Based on 2000 FIES, food expenditures account for 43.7 
percent of total expenditures.  At the national level, monthly income based on 2000 FIES was Php 12,003. 
 
 11 
Each household head had been to school for an average of ten years. This implies 
that they had completed only secondary or high school education. Thirty percent of the 
sampled household had working mothers. 
  
In low-density areas 73 percent of households had backyards, while this figure was 
only 44 percent for households in high-density areas. Over all, 61 percent of households 
had backyards. 
 
These two household characteristics (i.e. the mother‟s employment status and the 
presence of a backyard) were found to be significant in explaining household waste 
management practices such as waste separation and composting (Bennagen et al 2002). 
Based on self-reported waste generation, the average total amount of waste disposed of by 
the sampled households was 1.49 kg/day.11 
 
Table 3. Household Socio-economic Characteristics by Population Density, Olongapo City 
        
Variables Unit High Density Low Density All 
        
  mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
        
Annual income PhP 13936 10715 12115 10583 12843 10658 
Annual expenditure Php 12287 7371 11461 7068 11791 7192 
Household size # persons 5.4 2.6 5.6 2.3 5.5 2.4 
Education of household head # years 10 3 10 3 10 3 
Age of the household head # years 51 14 47 13 48 14 
Revenue from selling 
recyclables PhP/mo 11 16 14 31 13 26 
Self reported total waste 
disposed Kg/day/hh 1.35 1.02 1.59 1.11 1.49 1.02 
        
        
Mother employed % reporting yes 30 31 30 
Presence of yard % reporting yes 44 73 61 
House owned % reporting yes 44 70 60 
        
 
In terms of waste management practices, less than half of the sampled households 
(43 percent) practiced waste segregation and only 16 percent engaged in composting 
(Table 4).  About 25 percent of those who engaged in waste separation reported that they 
only started this year as a result of the waste segregation program set up by the local 
government. Composting of biodegradables is not widely practiced in the city.  As 
expected, there were more households in high-density areas that segregated waste, while 
there were more households in the low-density areas that burnt waste.  
Almost all of the sampled households reported that there were people who visited 
their communities to buy or collect recyclables.  Most of the households sold or gave away 
recyclables to these collectors, while a much smaller percentage returned used bottles to 
get back the deposit.  In the low-density communities, where incomes were lower, a 
greater percentage sold their recyclables than in the high-density areas.   
The buyers and collectors of recyclables serve as an alternative to municipal waste 
disposal. They are therefore an important consideration in the implementation of any 
incentive-based solid waste management policy that aims to divert wastes from disposal 
                                                          
11 This estimate when translated into per capita terms result in 0.28 per capita and is comparable to that 
estimated  by GHK/MRM study cited in Bennagen et al. (2002) for Olongapo City of  0.30 per capita.   
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sites.  In the absence of alternatives, the imposition of unit pricing may result in significant 
illegal dumping.  
On average, only a small percentage (12 percent) of households bought trash bags 
to dispose of their wastes; most households made use of plastic shopping bags they got 
from markets and commercial stores.  However, there were significantly more households 
in the high-density communities that bought trash bags.  Higher income is one explanation 
for this, however the fact that the shops selling trash bags are more accessible to these 
communities is probably also a factor. This issue is important since a pay-as-you-throw 
system will require households to purchase garbage bags. 
 
Table 4. Household Solid Waste Management Practices by 
Population Density, Olongapo City (percentage of households 
reporting “yes”) 
    
Variables High Density Low Density All  
    
    
Segregating * 51 37 43 
Composting  
 
Managing food wastes as hogfood 
 
14 18 16 
 
Recyling     
  Return bottles 25 28 27 
  Sell * 71 87 80 
  Give away 92 91 91 
  Reuse 93 97 95 
Burning     
  Mixed dry waste * 15 33 25 
  Yard waste* 26 63 48 
  Mixed dry and yard waste * 32 71 55 
Purchasing of trash bags * 17 9 12 
    
  *  Comparison of means test yielded significant results at 5% level. 
 
Eighty-eight percent of households reported that they were aware of the city‟s 
waste management program (Table 5).  The program was featured on local television and 
radio which explains this finding. At the local level, each barangay conducts an 
information and education campaign on the program. However, the survey indicated that 
awareness of these local programs is very low: only 23 percent reported that they were 
aware of their respective barangay programs.  This awareness was significantly lower in 
low-density communities with only 15 percent of the households reporting awareness of 
their local program.  It is clear that local efforts to promote waste management programs 
are lacking. 
The garbage fee collected by the City is P30-40 per month. About 55 percent 
indicated that this is reasonable (neither too high nor low), with high-density communities 
more satisfied than low-density communities. This is also true with respect to levels of 
satisfaction with the city‟s collection services. About 20 percent indicated there should be 
no garbage fee, most of these were in the low-density barangays. 
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The sampled households were also asked whether they found the idea of volume-
based pricing of garbage acceptable.  More than half of the respondents (62 percent) 
agreed with the idea.  It is interesting to note that there was no significant difference in the 
responses of households in the two density groups on this issue.   
Households were asked whether they see any illegal dumping of wastes in their 
surroundings. Only 26 percent said “yes”.  It is important to note that 32 percent of 
households in low-density communities reported that they had seen illegal dumping 
compared to only 17 percent in high-density barangays.  This result was expected since the 
monitoring of illegal dumping is more difficult in these areas.  Moreover, about 25 percent 
of the households in these areas are located in the hilly parts that are not serviced by 
garbage trucks.   
 
Table 5. Household Response to Different Aspects of Solid Waste Management by Population 
Density, Olongapo City (percentage of households reporting “yes”). 
    
Variables High Density  Low Density  All  
    
Awareness of City Govt.  waste segregation program 







Reasonableness of amount of garbage fee collected * 68 47 55 
Satisfaction with collection services * 87 76 81 
Acceptability of idea of a volume-based pricing system 56 66 62 
Garbage collection as a responsibility of government 34 45 40 
Observation of unauthorized dumping * 17 32 26 
    
 








6.0 THE EXPERIMENT 
6.1 Experiment Design 
The sample for the experiment was drawn exclusively from the high-density 
barangays.  This decision was made to minimize the likelihood of illegal dumping taking 
place. It was taken in light of the socio-economic survey results which indicated that 
illegal dumping is higher in low-density barangays.  
For the experiment, a sub-sample of 72 households was randomly drawn from the 
list of households in high-density barangays that had participated in the socio-economic 
survey.  The 72-household sample size represented 50 percent of the sampled households 
in the high-density barangay.12  There were four drop-outs during the course of the 
experiment.  
The households were provided with a cash incentive for their participation in the 
experiment and a separate „per-bag‟ cash incentive for reducing waste.  Their waste 
generation and disposal behavior was monitored over an eight-week period during 
February and March 2003. During this time their garbage was collected and weighed twice 
each week.13  The participating households were provided with color-coded plastic bags 
and trash cans, one color for each type of waste.  The following waste types were collected 
and weighed:  food and kitchen wastes, recyclables, garden wastes and non-recyclable 
wastes (please refer to glossary at the end of the report for definition of these wastes).  
The eight-week waste monitoring period was broken down into four sub-periods: 
pre-baseline, baseline, SUP-1 and SUP-2 (SUP=simulated unit pricing).  This was done to 
observe how household waste disposal behavior changed in response to price incentives.  
Other concerns relating to unit pricing were also examined during the eight-week 
experiment. These were: household‟s response to the provision of trash bags and cans and 
illegal dumping behavior.   
The following activities were undertaken in each sub-period: 
1) Pre-baseline (first two weeks) – Each household‟s wastes were weighed 
twice a week. No plastic bags or trash cans were provided.  
2) Baseline (second two weeks) – Each household was provided with color-
coded plastic bags and trash cans and their wastes were weighed twice a week.  The bags 
were distributed to ensure uniformity in waste measurements. The data collected during 
this period were used as the basis for bag allocation in the two simulated unit pricing 
periods.  
3) Simulated unit pricing 1 or SUP-1 (third two weeks) – Each household was 
provided with a number of bags based on the baseline waste measurement data and was 
offered a cash incentive per bag that was unused. In this period, the participants were 
divided into two groups: Group A and Group B. Each group was further subdivided into 
                                                          
12 The sample includes the 11 households covered during the trial experiment that was implemented in 
October-November 2002 to pilot test the waste measurement procedures.  The measurement data collected in 
the trial experiment was included in the statistical analysis conducted thereafter in as much as the procedural 
refinements implemented resulting from the pilot test were minor.   




two groups: Group A-1 and A-2 and Group B-1 and B-2.  The participants in Group A 
were told that the experiment would end in two weeks and those in Group B were told it 
would end in four weeks. The objective of the A-B grouping was to observe any illegal 
dumping behavior. The objective of the sub-grouping (A-1 & A-2 and B-1 & B-2) was to 
increase the price variation across the experiment.  The household wastes in all groups 
were weighed also twice a week. 
4) Simulated unit pricing or SUP-2 (last two weeks) – The participating 
households in Group B continued on with the experiment and their wastes were weighed 
twice a week.  As mentioned above, the objective of extending the participation of Group 
B households was to observe any difference in the waste disposal behavior of the 
participants in terms of illegal dumping.   
The discussion above is summarized in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Experiment design of simulated unit pricing. 
 
Group A* (n=42 hh) 
 
 
Period          Pre-baseline     Baseline                 SUP-1    
 
 







Group B (n=30 hh)  
 











Each subgroup of groups A and B faced different cash incentives (Php3 and Php6) 
during the SUP-1 period. In SUP-2, the incentives faced by the two subgroups of group B 
were increased from Php3 to Php 4.5 for subgroup B-1 and from Php6 to Php9 for 
subgroup B-2.  The reference unit price was P6.00 per bag. This is the estimated user fee 
(including external costs) based on the full cost accounts of the ESMO (see Appendix 
Table 2).   
Measure 
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The changes in the cash incentive per bag are summarized below (in Php): 
 
Period  Group A 
Subgrp A-1  Subgrp A-2 
  (n=15)  (n=27) 
Group B 
Subgrp B-1  Subgrp B-2 
  (n=15)  (n=15) 
Baseline  (week 3-4)   0                     0   0                    0 
SUP-1  (weeks 5-6)   3.00             6.00   3.00             6.00 
SUP-2  (week 7-8)   --                  --   4.50             9.00  
 Note:  P6 is the estimated unit price per bag (see Appendix Table 2 for calculation). 
*Group A includes data of 11 households of Bry. Banicain from the trial experiment.  
 
 
It would have been ideal if the city government had agreed to suspend the fixed 
garbage collection fee and replace it, for the duration of the experiment, with a unit fee for 
the households covered by the experiment.  However, offering a cash incentive (unit price) 
for each unit reduction in garbage, simulated the imposition of a unit charge in the 
following fashion.  Conceptually, a household moves up from the x-intercept (the point 
where marginal utility of MU is zero) of its demand curve to the point where MU equals 
the unit cash incentive.  If an actual unit price were charged, the household moves down 
the demand curve up to the unit price. (Please refer to Figure 1 for the demand curve for 
solid waste services.) 
6.2 Results of the Experiment 
6.2.1 Overall Results of Waste Measurements 
Table 6 summarizes the results of the waste measurements for the different types 
of household wastes collected and weighed (see also Figure 3).  Column two shows the 
waste measurements collected during the baseline period of the experiment.14  The 
measurements indicate that, on the average, an urban household of Olongapo generated 
2.01 kg/day of total wastes. Of this, non-recyclable wastes accounted for about 43 percent, 
food/kitchen wastes for 40 percent, recyclables 10 percent and yard wastes 7 percent.  
Based on these measurements, the total annual waste generated by the residential sector 
city-wide was 32,255 tons and per capita waste generated was 0.34 kg/day.15 Based on 
volume, the average bag (small size) consumption per day was 0.49 bags. 
 
 
                                                          
14 The bags weighed during the pre-baseline averaged 1.37 kg/day.   
15 Existing per capita waste generation estimates for Olongapo City range from 0.30 kg/day for the 




 Table 6.  Comparison of Waste Generation during Baseline and SUP Periods. 
    
Waste type Baseline SUP         Change  kg/day        % 
    
Weight (kg/day)    
Non-recyclable 0.86 0.65  -0.21*        -24 
Recyclable 





  0.12 
  0.07              9 
   Reusable 0.21 0.25   0.04            19 
   Yard  0.13 0.14   0.01              8 
    







 -0.09 *      -  5 
    
Volume (bags/day)    
Non-recyclable            0.49             0.34 
 
-0.15*        -31 
 
Recyclable 
   Food/kitchen 
           0.34 
           0.12 
            0.33 
            0.11 
 -0.01         -  3 
 -0.01         -  8 
   Reusable            0.14             0.16   0.02           14 
   Yard            0.08             0.06  -0.02*       -25 
 
Total waste generated 
(bags/day) 
           0.83             0.67  -0.16        - 19 
* Significant at 5 percent level. 
 
 The baseline information on waste composition suggests that households in 
Olongapo City were already diverting almost half of their total wastes away from the 
disposal site.  They were doing this by managing their food/kitchen wastes as hog food 
and by selling or giving away their reusables such as old newspapers, plastic containers, 
etc.  Most of the households (76 percent) set aside their food and kitchen wastes as hog 
food to be collected daily by neighbors with backyard piggeries.  No payments were made 
for these wastes.  Some recyclables were sold to ambulant buyers, but most of it was given 
away for free.  The households with backyards either included their yard wastes in the 
non-recyclable waste bags collected by the garbage trucks or burnt them.  
 Column three of Table 6 gives the waste measurements during the simulated unit 
pricing period (SUP). Households reduced the weight and volume of their non-recyclable 
wastes by 0.21 kg/day and 0.15 bags/day, respectively, in response to the price incentive.  
Percentage-wise, the response in terms of volume is higher compared to the response in 
terms of weight (31 vs. 24 percent).  This is expected since the incentive was pegged on 
the number of bags saved or unused.  
At the same time, households increased their food wastes, reusables and yard 
wastes. This increase was, however, not as proportionately large as the reduction in non-
recyclables.  These changes resulted in changes in the overall composition of household‟s 
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waste:  non-recyclables now accounted for 34 percent (down from 43 percent) of total 
wastes (Table 7).   Figure 3 shows these changes graphically. 
Table 7.  Household Waste Composition During Baseline vs. Simulated Unit Pricing 
(SUP), Olongapo City, 2003. 
 
Waste Type       Under flat fee 
Tons/yr        % of  TW 
     Under  SUP 
Tons/yr           % of  TW 
Non-recyclable 13,531                  43              10,227                    34 
Recyclable 18,094                  57     19,510                    66 
Total waste (TW) 31,625                 100 29,737                  100 
 
Figure 3.   Waste Generation by Waste Type During Baseline vs. Simulated 
Unit Pricing (SUP) Olongapo City, 2003. 






       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
6.2.2 Disaggregating the Reduction in Non-recyclable Wastes 
The reduction in non-recyclable wastes of 0.21 kg/day can explained in the 
following way: food/kitchen wastes increased by 0.07 kg/day, reusables by 0.04 kg/day, 
and yard wastes by 0.01 kg/day (Table 8).  The remainder of .09 kg/day can be considered 
unexplained reductions.  This unaccounted portion may be due to household practices that 
the experiment could not monitor or quantify, e.g. changes in consumption patterns, or, 
perhaps more importantly, illegal disposal.   
As several households shared the location where waste containers were left for 
collection by city trucks, it was difficult to quantitatively assess the extent of illegal 
disposal by the participating households. 
Baselin
eeeeee  
Simulated Unit Pricing  
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It was suggested that any “illegal” waste disposal behavior might be affected by 
the length of time the experiment lasted. This is because, the longer the experiment, the 
more costly it would be for households to „hide‟ waste or to transport it to places where 
they could illegally dump it.  As explained, this was the reason why the experiment was 
conducted for two weeks with one group and four weeks with the other. 
The results of the statistical analysis using T-test shown in Table 8 imply that the 
behavior of the two groups during the SUP is the same.  Therefore, it is difficult to infer if 
any strategic behavior occurred in either of the two groups in response to the price 
incentive. 
 
Table 8. Comparison of  Non-recyclable Waste Reduction by Group. 
    





    
Average reduction in weight  (kg/day) 0.23 0.13 1.104 
    
Average reduction in volume  (bag/day) 0.12 0.13 -0.027 
    
*Group A excludes Bry. Banicain data 
 
A post-survey interview was conducted to further investigate illegal disposal.  Ten 
households were randomly drawn from each group.  They were asked how they had 
responded to the price incentive.  They were also asked whether the idea of unit pricing 
was acceptable.  
Table 9 indicates that 20 percent of the sampled households either increased their 
non-recyclable wastes or that their wastes changed minimally during the experiment.  
Thus, 80 percent of the sampled households reduced their non-recyclable wastes in 
response to the incentive.  These households were asked about the waste reduction 
practices, legitimate or otherwise, they had adopted during the experiment.  
In particular, the households were asked whether they unintentionally gave their 
plastic bags to the city trucks on some days during the experiment.  Eight of the 20 
households (four in each group) admitted they did.  They were also asked whether they 
tried to save on the use of plastic bags by stomping on their wastes. Four households in 
each group said “yes”.  Two households in each group admitted to burning their wastes.  
When asked whether it was the cash incentive that motivated them to reduce wastes, many 
of the households, especially in the two-week SUP group, indicated the incentive did not 




Table 9.  Post-experiment Evaluation Results. 
 
Item Group A (# of hhs) 
Group B 
(# of hhs) 
   
Response to incentive  
(n=10 per group) 
  
  Reduced non-recyclable waste 8 8 
  Increased non-recyclable waste 2 1 
  Unchanged 0 1 
 
Practices to reduce waste 
  
(n=8 per group)    
  Increased recyclables 8 8 
  Diverted more food wastes 5 6 
  Compressed (stomped) bags 4 8 
  Increased reuse 4 6 
  Purchases with less packaging 4 2 
  Burned dry wastes 2 2 
  Burned yard wastes     2 *   3 ** 
  Composted food waste 0 1 
  Reduced purchases 0 0 
 
Incentive motivated waste 






Garbage was given to truck 






Acceptance of unit pricing as 









***maximum of 2 times 
In qualitative terms, therefore, it can be concluded that there was no illegal 
disposal behavior in the two groups in response to the cash incentive. 
6.2.3 Estimating the Household Response to the Incentive 
Two functional forms of the demand curve were estimated to examine the 
household response to unit pricing:  linear and double log. Unit price, household income 
and other socio-economic household characteristics were independent variables.  In the 
double log equation, the baseline observations of zero price were discarded as the 
functional form cannot have an x-intercept. In the regression, it was assumed that monthly 
household income was constant for the duration of the experiment.  The study 
hypothesizes that there are welfare gains in the aggregate with the introduction of a unit 
pricing scheme.  
In order to test the hypothesis that unit pricing of garbage reduces the quantity of 
household non-recyclable wastes, regression analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
was conducted with price and some socio-economic household characteristics.  Income, 
household size and education have all been found to influence demand for solid waste 
services and these were therefore included as explanatory variables.  Moreover, the value 
of time measured by the wage rate is also an influential variable in household waste 
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management.  This variable was proxied in the model by a dummy variable relating to the 
employment of the mother of the household (who has an important role in household 
waste management).  Finally, a dummy variable to reflect how households manage their 
food and kitchen wastes was included in the regression model.  The main focus of the 
exercise was, however, the coefficient of the price incentive since that gave an estimate of 
the price elasticity of demand for solid waste services.   
It has been shown in a previous study that unit pricing has a more substantial effect 
on the volume of garbage produced than on its weight (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996).  
The volume of non-recyclable wastes was therefore also regressed on the same 
explanatory variables.  The variables are defined in Table 10 and the results of the 
regression analysis using ordinary least squares are given in Table 11. 
 
Table 10.  Description of Variables  Used in Regression 
    
Variables Mean Std. dev. Description 
    
WEIGHT_NRW 0.743 0.609 Weight of non-recyclable waste (kg/day/hh) 
    
VOLUME_NRW 0.396 0.210 Volume of non-recyclable waste (bags/day) 
    
PRICE 3.129 3.034 Price incentive per bag unused 
    
INCOME 12728 9713 Monthly household income (Php) 
    
HH_SIZE 5.9 2.7 Household size (# person) 
    
EDUC 10.2 2.8 Education of the HH head (# years) 
    
 Percentage   
    
D_MANAGEFW 74  Dummy for food waste management 
   1- FW collected by neighbors for hogfood 
   0- otherwise 
    
D_MOTHER 28  Dummy for employment of mother 
   1- Mother of household is employed 
   0 – otherwise 
 
In both equations the price coefficient (PRICE) was found to be significant at the 5 
percent level.  The demand elasticity estimates computed at sample means were –0.15 and 
–0.21 for the weight and volume equations, respectively.  These estimates imply an 
inelastic demand (as predicted by the empirical literature) and are within the range of the 
existing price elasticities mentioned earlier.  Household size (HH_SIZE) was also 
significant in both equations and has the expected positive sign.16  The dummy variable 
D_MANAGEFW was significant and negative which implies that when the mother of the 
                                                          
16  The equations were regressed with per capita waste as dependent variable and the same explanatory 
variables.  The household size coefficient is negative  and significant at 5 percent level.  The negative sign 
indicates the existence of economies of scale in waste generation, i.e., as the household increases in size, per 
capita waste generation declines (see Jenkins 1993). 
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household was employed, the quantity of non-recyclable wastes was higher than 
otherwise.  The results of the double log regression were generally not significant and are 
shown in Appendix Table 4. 
 
 
Table 11.  Regression Results with Non-recyclable Waste as Dependent Variable. 
       
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Non-recyclable Waste 
 
Weight Volume  
(kg/day) (#bags/day)  
    
Constant 0.642** 0.356** 
 (2.620) (5.211) 
    
PRICE -0.035** -0.026** 
 (-2.474) (-5.594) 
   
INCOME 3.48E-07 1.37E-06 
 (-0.078) (0.884) 
   
HH_SIZE 0.080** 0.030** 
 (5.256) (5.651) 
   
EDUC -9.81E-04 -0.001 
 (-0.054) (-0.237) 
   
D_MANAGEFW -0.297** -0.064* 
 (-2.543) (-2.010) 
    
D_MOTHER -0.149 -0.045 
 (-1.541) (-1.433) 
        
Elasticity estimate (at sample means)   -0.15   -0.21 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.24 
    
F-Statistics 6.011** 10.123** 
N   174   174 
*  significant at 10 percent level    
**  significant at 5 percent level    
 
6.2.4 Estimating the Impact on Waste Diversion and Disposal costs 
  Anually, the measurement results reveal that Olongapo City residents already 
divert at least 10,000 tons of their garbage away from the dumpsite by recycling and by 
managing their food wastes for hog food.  This amount represents 30 percent of their total 
wastes.  Based on the results of the experiment and under the assumption of no illegal 




One of the benefits of a unit pricing program are the collection and disposal costs 
that are avoided.  In the short run, only variable costs, which accounts for 25-30 percent of 
total costs, would be avoided with a shift from the traditional collection and disposal 
system to a unit pricing system.   
Olongapo City‟s collection and disposal costs of Php 929 per ton include both 
fixed and variable costs but exclude external costs. This means that unit pricing in the city 
would translate into avoided costs (excluding external costs) of about Php 920,000 
annually in the first three years. Subsequently, the city could save as much as Php 3.1 
million annually in saved SWM costs.  When external costs are incorporated, the savings 
would at least double. 
 The costs of implementing a unit pricing program, including the costs of any 
recycling programs, would have to be deducted from the avoided cost estimated above to 
derive the net benefit of the program.  These costs will depend on the type of unit pricing 
system that is adopted.  However, they would include start-up costs, such as personnel 
training and public education and outreach, and running costs, such as enforcement and 
monitoring.  
Currently, the City government spends about Php3.0 million in monitoring and 
enforcement, three-fourths of which is made up of labor costs. The enforcement costs of a 
unit pricing program will probably be higher to begin with, since it will initially encourage 
some illegal waste disposal.  However, given the findings of this study, local residents 
should adopt the new pricing scheme with little resistance. Moreover, the ESMO has 
indicated that illegal dumping of waste in the city is minimal.  Therefore, the increase in 
enforcement costs under a unit pricing program may be expected to be moderate.  Table 
12 summarizes the above discussion. 
 
Table 12.  Expected Direction of Costs, Revenues and Waste Tonnage Under Unit 
Pricing System.   
 
 Status quo (fixed fee) * 
(2001) 
Expected direction of change 
under unit pricing  
Total revenue (Php/yr) 16.4 million ** Increase initially, then  will 
stabilize as households respond 
to incentive 
 
Total cost  (Php/yr) 22.1  million Enforcement and information 
campaign costs will increase 
initially.  Total cost (both fixed 
and variable)  will decline 
subsequently as total waste 
diverted increases in response 
to incentive resulting in 
avoided costs 
 
Net revenue (Php/yr) - 5.7 million Positive  
 
Total waste disposed (t/yr) 23,748 Decline 
 
Total waste diverted (t/yr) 10,000 Increase 
 




*  Based on 2001 ESMO cost data.   
**  Revenues have increased substantially since last quarter of 2002 with the 30% percent increase 
in SWM fixed fees.  Therefore, net revenue in 2003 is expected to be positive if there are no major 
increases in  program costs. 
 
6.2.5  Estimating the Welfare Gains and Effects of Changes in Unit Price 
In estimating the welfare gain from unit pricing (or the triangle abc in Figure 1), 
the following assumptions are made:  (1)  the behavior of households in a real program 
will be the same as their behavior in the simulated unit pricing experiment;  (2) the 
experiment data generated is applicable to the whole of Olongapo City;  (3)  all 
households will participate in the program;  and (4) the elasticities generated in the 
simulated unit pricing are applicable to a real program. 
To estimate the welfare gains from unit pricing, the coefficient of the price 
variable in Table 11 was used.  The estimated welfare gain from unit pricing is Php 0.63 
per household per day or Php 9.91 million per year in the whole city.17  This welfare gain 
estimate represents about 40 percent of the total operating expenditures of Olongapo City 
in 2001. This implies that shifting to a unit pricing scheme would bring substantial social 
benefits for the city‟s residents.  
The estimate of the price elasticity of demand for solid waste services obtained 
from the regression analysis (– 0.15) implies that a 10 percent increase in the unit price 
will reduce non-recyclable wastes by 270 tons per year. 
As in any policy reform, there will be winners and losers in the short term from the 
implementation of unit pricing in Olongapo City. Some households will end up paying 
more since they will loose some of the consumer surplus they enjoyed under the flat fee 
pricing regime. Other households will pay less than the flat fee and will gain additional 
consumer surplus.  The experimental data generated by this research indicates that there 
would be more winners than losers. The ratio between them would be 6:4.   
                                                          
17 The formula used in estimating welfare gain per household per day is:  /2 ( p2), where  is the slope or 
the coefficient of the price variable in the OLS regression and p is the unit price.  Note that  is the inverse 




7.0 PROPOSED UNIT PRICING SYSTEM FOR OLONGAPO CITY 
7.1 Basic Elements of a Unit Pricing System18 
The design of a unit pricing system involves the following processes or decisions 
(EPA 2000):  (1)  choosing a volume- or weight-based system;  (2)  selecting containers; 
(3) examining pricing structures;  (4)  considering billing and payment procedures; (5) 
determining service options and complementary programs.  Each of these processes needs 
to be considered in the design of a unit pricing system for Olongapo City. 
The first issue is how wastes will be measured: Weight-based programs tend to be 
more expensive to implement but offer more incentives for waste reduction than volume-
based programs.  Volume-based programs are easier to implement and are therefore 
considered below. 
There are three container options for a volume-based system:  a can system (small 
or large); a bag system; and a tag or sticker system.  In the can system, the program 
implementer usually provides the container to ensure uniformity.  The bag and the tag or 
sticker systems involve the purchase of bags or stickers from designated outlets. The cost 
of these items normally includes the cost of waste collection. These schemes are therefore 
referred to as pre-paid volume-based systems.  Tag and sticker systems have been found to 
be easier and less expensive to implement (compared to can systems) but there is greater 
revenue uncertainty.   
There are four types of rate or pricing structure for unit pricing schemes:  (1)  a 
proportional (linear) rate system;  (2)  a variable container rate system;  (3)  a two-tiered 
rate system; and (4)  a multi-tiered rate system.   
The proportional rate system charges households a flat price for each uniform 
sized-container of waste they place out for collection, while the variable container rate 
system charges different rates for different sized containers.  Two-tiered rate systems 
charge households both a fixed fee and a separate per-container charge, while the multi-
tiered rate system charges households a fixed fee plus variable fees for different container 
sizes. 
Each system has advantages and disadvantages and the choice depends on various 
factors such as: the objective of the unit pricing program, the revenue goals of the 
community, and the administrative capability of the local government that will implement 
the program.  The proportional rate system is the simplest rate structure and provides a 
strong incentive to reduce wastes, however it does not ensure a stable revenue stream.  The 
two-tiered rate system provides a more stable revenue flow but offers less waste reduction 
incentives since households will not have the incentive to reduce wastes below the 
minimum service level.  Variable container and multi-tiered rate systems create strong 
incentives to reduce waste but can be complicated to administer. 
With respect to billing and payment systems there are again, a number of options: 
the direct payment system allows residents to pay for waste collection services by 
purchasing bags or stickers from the local government outlets.  Subscription systems allow 
                                                          
18 The reader interested in this topic, particularly the advantages and disadvantages of the different unit 




residents to be billed on a regular basis.  An actual set-out system bills residents based on 
the actual number of containers set out for collection.  This system can be impractical 
since the hauler has to count the number of bags, tags or cans set out and then record the 
information for billing purposes. 
Finally, the unit pricing program can be designed in such a way that it is 
accompanied by complementary services such as recycling and composting.  The 
provision of these services ensures that residents have ways of reducing their wastes in 
response to the incentives offered by the pricing program.  
7.2 Basic Design of a Unit Pricing System for Olongapo City  
This study proposes a two-phased, volume-based unit pricing program for 
Olongapo City:  a two-tiered, volume-based pricing system in the first phase (short term), 
followed by a proportional rate structure in the second phase (long term,).19  The first 
phase will allow the local government to get a feel for how a unit pricing program works 
and at the same time maintain, or even increase, its revenues. Residents will be introduced 
to unit pricing in a gradual manner and at the same time will have an incentive to reduce 
their waste.   
After the third or fourth year, it is expected that both the local officials and 
residents will be ready for a unit pricing system with a proportionate rate structure in 
which the incentive to reduce will be higher.  Only the first phase of the program is 
discussed below since the implementation details of the second phase will depend on the 
outcome of the first. 
Under the proposed two-tiered, volume-based system, the ESMO can either 
implement a bag or tag system.  The fixed fee portion of the system will entail households 
paying the current flat fee of P40-50 per month for the collection of not more than two 
small bags of waste per collection day.20  The billing and payment system for this portion 
of the program will continue as at present, that is, through their monthly electricity bill. 
The variable portion of the proposed unit pricing system will entail households 
who put out more than two bags per collection paying for each additional bag.  The price 
per bag will be P6.00. This reflects the marginal social costs of waste collection and 
disposal.21  Bags or stickers will be sold at the City Hall and other recognized commercial 
outlets.  The bags will have a unique mark or logo and bags (in excess of the minimum 
two bags) without the mark will not be collected.  Strict monitoring of illegal disposal 
should accompany the program. 
Under this proposed system, the current monthly revenue of ESMO of P 1.5 
million will be maintained.22  The variable portion of the proposed system has the 
potential to generate about P140,000 from those residents who exceed the two-bag 
                                                          
19 During a meeting with the Olongapo City officials, they expressed preference for the two-tiered pricing 
structure to allow for stable revenues and at the same time penalize residents who generate too much waste. 
20 The average weekly usage of bags during the experiment was three bags per household.  Since garbage 
collection is done twice a week, an allocation of two bags per collection per household is being proposed for 
practical purposes. 
21 The P6.00/bag assumes average cost is equal to marginal cost.  This price should be updated as required 
since this was estimated using 2001 cost figures of ESMO.   




minimum service level.  This amount can be expected to decrease over time as these 
households respond to the incentive to reduce waste, although this decrease will be 
relatively small in view of the inelastic demand for solid waste services discussed earlier.  
This extra revenue can be used to strengthen enforcement and monitoring programs.   
There may be no need for ESMO to provide recycling collection services to 
complement the unit pricing scheme, since household recycling collection is already being 
done effectively by the informal sector.  The ESMO can enhance resource recovery by 
providing information to the public regarding which recyclables have market value.  For 
instance, during the experiment, most of the households did not know that soft aluminum 
wrappers from shampoo and candies are being collected by the pushcart boys.  On the 
other hand, there is as yet no market for empty tin cans of soft drinks and beer.  ESMO 
should conduct research to identify markets for these recyclables. 
It may be useful for ESMO to encourage or support community composting 
programs to reduce the amount of food and kitchen waste that is disposed of as non-
recyclable waste.  There is a lot of room to divert more of these wastes since about 50 




8.0   SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Waste Generation and Practices 
1) Forty-three percent of households practice waste segregation; 16 percent engage in 
composting; the majority set aside their food/kitchen wastes for hog food, while 
almost all households engage in some kind of recycling (i.e., they reuse, sell or 
give away recyclables, or return bottles for their deposit).  About 25 percent 
engage in some waste burning (mixed dry and yard wastes).  
2) Most households make use of used plastic bags to dispose of their garbage.  Only 
12 percent purchase commercial garbage bags . 
3) Based on actual waste measurements, the average household in Olongapo City 
generates 2.01 kgs/day of garbage.  This gives a total of 32,255 tons per year. 
4) Non-recyclable wastes account for 43 percent of total wastes generated;  
food/kitchen wastes, 40 percent;  reusables 10 percent,  and yard wastes  7 percent. 
5) The household sector diverts at least 30 percent of their garbage away from 
dumpsite through: (1) the management of food/kitchen wastes as hog food; and (2)  
selling or giving away recyclables to the informal recycling sector. 
6) The informal sector, consisting of junkshops and ambulant waste collectors, is in 
charge of waste collection for recycling. 
Attitudes to SWM Program 
7) Awareness of the city government SWM program is high (88 percent) but   
awareness of the barangay SWM program is low (23 percent). 
8) Eigthy-one percent expressed satisfaction with collection services (this was higher 
in high-density areas). 
9) Regarding garbage fees: 55 percent felt they were reasonable, 25 percent indicated 
there should be no fees, and the rest said that the fees should be lower. 
10) Twenty-six percent said that they observed unauthorized dumping of garbage in 
their surroundings (this was higher in low-density areas) 
11) More than 50 percent of the households found the idea of unit-based pricing 
acceptable.  
SWM Collection and Disposal Costs 
12) The cost of collecting and disposing of one ton of household garbage in Olongapo 
City was P 929 (year 2001 values).  Personel services accounted for 70 percent.  
This cost doubles when external costs are considered. 
13) A monthly fee of P42 to collect and dispose of household garbage would recover 
collection and disposal costs. 
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Impacts of Unit Pricing 
14) Non-recyclable wastes declined by 0.21 kg/day/household or by 24 percent in 
response to unit pricing, while recyclables increased by 0.12 kg/day.  There is a 
portion of the decline in non-recyclables that is unaccounted for.  There is, 
however, no strong indication that households engaged in large-scale illegal 
disposal. 
15) The price elasticity of demand for solid waste services is –0.15.  This suggests that 
the demand is inelastic, i.e., an increase in the unit price will elicit a smaller change 
in waste reduction. 
16) The cost of waste collection and disposal that can be avoided thanks to unit pricing 
can be as much as Php 3.1million annually.  Recycling costs on the part of 
government would be minimum because the informal sector is already actively and 
effectively involved. 
17) Welfare gains of Php 9.9 million annually can be enjoyed by society if unit pricing 
replaces a fixed-rate system.  If implemented by the City government, the policy 




9.0  POLICY  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The overall findings of the study suggest that shifting from the existing flat fee 
structure to unit pricing of solid waste in Olongapo City has the potential to enhance waste 
diversion and create welfare gains.  The waste measurements conducted by the study 
indicate that the residential sector is already diverting at least 30 percent of their garbage 
through various alternative waste management practices such as household recycling and 
managing food wastes.  Thus, while the City is already in compliance with the 
requirement of Republic Act 9003 requiring local governments to divert 25 percent of 
their garbage within the next five years, the implementation of unit pricing would further 
increase this rate of waste diversion and at the same time generate social gains.  The study 
thus recommends that the City shift from its present flat fee garbage pricing to a unit 
pricing program to increase social welfare.  
Although the idea of a unit pricing system of garbage appears to be acceptable to 
the majority of the City residents, its acceptability as a new pricing scheme remains to be 
seen in practice.  Residents will have to be convinced that the new program will be fair 
and that the City government will be able to monitor and check whatever illegal disposal 
may result.  An aggressive information campaign would be necessary to gain public 
support for the new pricing system.  The winners of this policy reform can be harnessed by 
the City government as the natural constituency of this campaign.    
Finally, the results of this study can be used by the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources (DENR) to promote unit pricing of solid waste services among 
local government units (LGUs) that are as progressive as Olongapo City in their solid 
waste management programs.  As demonstrated by the study, these LGUs can use this 
policy instrument as a tool to meet their waste diversion targets, promote recycling, and 
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Cost Component 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
      
      
Personal Services 1   7,928,412    8,154,318    9,586,112    12,000,036    14,351,827  
  Salaries and Wages   2,409,845    2,409,845    3,378,878    5,216,085    5,943,260  
  Insurance and other benefits   2,059,415    2,059,415    2,522,176    3,098,893    3,643,362  
  Oversight and Support Services 5   3,459,152    3,685,058    3,685,058    3,685,058    4,765,205  
      
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses   2,170,284    2,604,527    2,444,781    4,148,733    4,940,995  
  Travel and transportation   65,584    83,886    78,194    89,239    112,760  
  Communications and other utilities 3     12,746    17,240    18,885    36,880    54,122  
  Repair of Furniture and Equipment     -     1,820    -     752   3,760  
  Vehicle Maintenance and Rental 4   496,167    560,328    749,172    1,446,718    1,122,682  
  Supplies and Materials   74,477    113,887    98,629    133,824    150,400  
  Gas and Oil    1,407,743    1,713,800    1,386,333    2,327,753    3,383,703  
  Office Rental 6    113,568    113,568    113,568    113,568    113,568  
Subtotal (Personal services and MOE)   10,098,696    10,758,846    12,030,893    16,148,770    19,292,822  
      
Up-Front Costs      
  Depreciation (1)   1,385,604    1,607,527    1,438,421    1,467,764    1,264,772  
  Vehicles 7   897,173    1,053,173    875,449    911,418    715,273  
  Equipment and Office Furniture 8   26,667    92,589    101,208    94,581    87,734  
  Landfill 9   461,765    461,765    461,765    461,765    461,765  
      
Back-End Costs       
  Amortized Closure and Post-closure Care 10 n.e. n.e. n.e.   1,471,917    1,507,908  
      
      
Total Cost (without back-end costs)   11,484,301    12,366,372    13,469,314    17,616,533    20,557,594  
Total Cost (with back-end costs) n.e. n.e. n.e.   19,088,451    22,065,502  
      
      
Estimated # of tons of solid waste collected   20,075    20,805    20,130    21,900    23,748  
SWM service cost/ton w/out back-end costs(PhP/yr)   572    594    669    804    866  
SWM service cost/ton w/ back-end costs(PhP/yr) n.e. n.e. n.e.   872    929  
# of households served   32,032    32,693    33,367    34,055    34,742  
# of tons of household waste collected and disposed11   16,060    16,644    16,104    17,520    18,998  
SWM service cost  of  household sector ( 000 PhP) n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e. 17,,652 
SWM servce cost per household per month (PhP)12 n.e. n.e. n.e.   37    42  
SWM service cost per bag 13   n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e.   2.73  
      
Notes:       
1. Personnel Costs include only salaries 1 Public Service Foreman, 1 Laborer, 1 Public Utility Worker and those under Waste Disposal 
and Waste Collection Services (drivers and metro aides) 
2. Includes (1) 60 percent of Representation and Transportation Allowance based on Department Head's estimate of proportion for 
SWM activities and (2) 75.20 percent of Travel and Transportation Expense based on personnel share. 
3. Includes 75.20 percent of Telephone and Power and Illumination expenses. Other overhead expenses, namely Repair of Furniture 
and Equipment, Supplies and Materials, and Office Rental are allocated in the same manner. 
4. Includes Repair and Servicing of MVSPL, Vehicle and Equipment Rental, Vehicle Insurance Premiums and Registration Fees. The 
figures that appear here are based on share of vehicles. Expenses for Gas and Oil is treated in the same manner. 
5. Based on the following estimates of proportion of time spent by non-SWM personnel on SWM activities: Dept. Head and Asst. 
Dept. Head- 60 percent, Research- 3 days per month, Admin and Support- 1 week per month and Accounting/Budget/Government 
Office - 11 days per month 
6. ESMO estimated cost of office rental (102 sq.m.) is PhP 13,000 per month. Assumed no increase in rental cost from 
1996 to 2002.  
 
7. Depreciation cost of vehicles is computed as : acquisition cost ÷ useful life. If information on the month the asset was acquired is 
available, depreciation on the year of acquisition includes only the number of months it was used in that year and the rest is credited on 
the last year of its useful life.  Otherwise, 6 months is credited on the year of acquisition and 6 months on the last year of useful life.  
8. Useful life of office furniture is assumed to be 4 years, computers- three years, while for other equipment it is assumed to be five years. 
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Some assets were not included due to lack of data in either acquisition cost or date of acquisition. Allocation is again based on personnel 
share. 
9. Depreciation cost of landfill is based on its market value and its remaining useful life in 1996. Estimated useful life is 50 years, which 
starts in 1980 when the landfill was acquired.  
10. Based on ESMO current estimate of total closure and post-closure cost of PhP 80M. This amount was adjusted to 2000 prices, 
yielding a figure of PhP 73.65 M. This was computed using the following formula: (Estimated cost of Closure and Post closure plans x 
Capacity of Landfill used for household garbage) ÷ Estimated total capacity of landfill (see worksheet "backend cost") 
11. Assumes a ratio of 80:20 for residential to commercial and other wastes     
12. 80% of total service cost/number of household served/12 months.   
13. Refer to Appendix Table 2 for calculation.   
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Appendix Table 2.  Computation of SWM service cost per bag, Olongapo City, 2001.  
    
 Unit Initial value Data source/remarks 
    
Waste information    
Total waste collected Tons   23,748    ESMO  
Total waste disposed  Tons   20,186    ESMO; assumes 15 percent is recovered at dumpsite  
Household waste collected Tons   18,998    ESMO; 80 percent of total wastes collected  
Average # of small bags used for household non-recyclables per month # bag/mo    15.50    Based on baseline waste measurement data of Brgy Banicain 
Average # of small bags used for household non-recyclables per year  # bag/yr    186.00    Based on baseline waste measurement data of Brgy Banicain 
    
Household information    
No. of households served by ESMO  # hh   34,742    ESMO; 85 percent of total households 
    
Cost Accounting    
Total cost of SW collection and disposal (w/ back-end costs) Php   22,065,502    Obtained from FCA 
Total household cost of collecting non-recyclable waste Php   17,652,402    80 percent of total cost is household service cost  
Total service cost per household per year Php   508.10    Total household cost divided by total number of households servced 
Household service cost per month Php   42    Total service cost per household divided by 12 months 
Service cost per bag (private costs only) Php   2.73    Service cost divided by adjusted average # of bags used 
Service cost per bag (private costs+external costs) Php   5.46  Assumes external cost of waste collection and disposal is equal to 
private cost. 
    
Cost Accounting    
Total cost of SW collection and disposal (w/ back-end costs) Php   22,065,502    Obtained from FCA 
Total household cost of collecting non-recyclable waste Php   17,652,402    80 percent of total cost is household service cost  
Total service cost per household per year Php   508.10    Total household cost divided by total number of households servced 
Household service cost per month Php   42    Total service cost per household divided by 12 months 
Service cost per bag (private costs only) Php   2.73    Service cost divided by adjusted average # of bags used 
Service cost per bag (private costs+external costs) Php   5.46  Assumes external cost of waste collection and disposal is equal to 
private cost. 









Appendix Table 3. Olongapo City Demographic Profile* and Survey Sample Size  
       
 Population No. of Household Land Area  Density No. of Puroks Sample Size 
   (ha) (pph)  (districts)  
       
Olongapo City 194,260 43,107 7,391 2,772 203 360 
       
High density barangays     
Banicain 6,654 1,609 13 504 10 14 
West Tapinac 7,420 1,770 15 493 10 15 
New Kalalake 8,718 1,899 26 330 8 16 
East Tapinac 10,058 2,317 43 235 12 20 
Pag-asa 5,716 1,300 27 215 6 11 
East Bajac-Bajac 18,725 4,202 94 200 27 36 
New Ilalim 1,484 362 8 193 5 3 
New Kababae 2,092 467 11 188 4 4 
Asinan 3,389 843 24 141 9 7 
West Bajac-Bajac 8,015 1,822 65 124 7 16 
Subtotal 72,271 16,591 325 2,622 98 144 
        
Low density barangays     
Mabayuan 10,305 2,250 273 38 7 18 
Barretto 15,816 3,434 496 32 18 28 
Gordon Heights 21,536 4,676 862 25 25 38 
Sta. Rita 33,477 7,407 1529 22 24 60 
Kalaklan 10,340 2,276 750 14 11 19 
Old Cabalan 12,348 2,727 1200 10 13 22 
New Cabalan 18,167 3,746 1956 9 7 31 
Subtotal 121,989 26,516 7,066 150 105 216 
       








Appendix Table 4. Double Log Regression Result.  
      
Independent variables 




   
Constant -0.533 0.654** 
 (-0.961) (-2.124) 
   
LOG_PRICE -0.159 -0.199 
 (-0.603) (-1.362) 
   
LOG_INC -3.81E-02 3.39E-02 
 (-0.268) (0.430) 
   
LOG_HSIZE 0.820** 0.528** 
 (3.622) (4.204) 
   
LOG_EDUC -0.067 -0.205 
 (-0.226) (-1.252) 
   
D_MANAGEFW -0.125 -0.084 
 (-1.321) (-1.586) 
   
D_MOTHER 8.95E-02 -5.12E-02 
 (-0.940) (-0.968) 
       
Elasticity estimate (at sample means) -0.16 -0.20 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.15 
   
F-Statistics 2.590** 3.925** 
N 102 102 






















Appendix  5.  Glossary 
 
Barangay  The basic political unit in the Philippines with a population of at least 
5,000 inhabitants in very major cities and municipalities and 2,000 
inhabitants in less urbanized areas. 
 
External costs Unintended effects of an action of an agent on others and for which the 
agent does not bear the consequences. 
 
FCA  Full Cost Accounting is a framework for examining the actual costs of 
SWM and serves as a useful tool for local governments to become 
aware of the environmental impacts of waste management through the 
identification and quantification, whenever feasible, of the external 
costs of improper waste management practices. 
 
Food wastes Left-over household wastes after cooking and eating 
 
RA 9003 Republic act or law entitled “The Ecological Solid Waste Management 
of 2000” enacted in January 2001. 
 
Recyclables  Waste that can be reused by the household or other individuals such as 
plastics, used paper, etc. 
 
Non-recycables            Household wastes that are disposed for collection and disposal by 
service trucks. 
 
SUP          Simulated Unit Pricing 
 
SWM          Solid Waste Management 
 
SWS         Solid Waste Services 
 
Unit pricing  Pricing of solid waste collection and disposal services based on the level 
of service, either in volume, weight or bulk. 
 
WTP        Willingness to pay 
 
